Abstract: This paper examines the current state of the trade policy regime in Vietnam against the backdrop of market-oriented policy reforms undertaken over the past one-anda-half decades. The core of the paper is an in-depth analysis of the structure of protection, focussing on both incentives for import-competing production the bias in the incentive structure against export production compared to import-competing production. It is found that, despite notable reform efforts, the structure of protection in Vietnam is still out of line with that of the major trading nations in the region, in terms of the level and the inter-industry dispersion of nominal and effective protection rates. There is a clear ani-export bias in the incentive structure, even though the degree of the bias has considerably declined over the years. There is no evidence to justify the existing protection structure on grounds of infant industry protection or employment generation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trade policy regime in Vietnam in the context of the trade liberalisation and other market-oriented reforms over the past oneand-a half decades. The study is motivated by the conviction that an appraisal of the existing policy regime is needed to inform both unilateral policy reforms in Vietnam and
INTRODUCTION
Following the announcement of doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986, the trade policy regime in Vietnam has undergone significant changes. With a slow and hesitant start in the late 1980s, significant reforms were undertaken in the first half of the 1990s with a view to reshaping the former closed command economy into a relatively open, marketbased economy. The reform process lost momentum during 1996-98 partly due to the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, but partly (perhaps even more so) due to domestic policy ambivalence and complacency resulted from the success of the initial reforms. There has however been a renewed emphasis on completing the unfinished reform agenda over the past three years. The key recent reform measures included dismantling of quantitative import restrictions (on all products except sugar and petroleum products), significant reduction in tariffs leading to some reduction in both the level and dispersion of effective rate of protection, initiatives to expose public sector enterprises to greater market discipline, relaxing restrictions on foreign direct investment, particularly in exportoriented projects, and lifting restrictions on private-sectors participation in foreign trade and setting up business ventures by private entities (individuals and companies). The purpose of this paper is to examine the trade policy regime in Vietnam in the context of the trade liberalisation and other market-oriented reforms over the past oneand-a half decades. The study is motivated by the conviction that an appraisal of the existing policy regime is needed to inform both unilateral policy reforms in Vietnam and Vietnam's effective participation in regional and global trade policy negotiations.
The study is based on analysis of secondary data from both national (Vietnamese) and international sources, review of previous studies, and interviews with officials of Ministry of Finance (MOF). The core of the paper is an in-depth analysis of the structure of protection based on fresh estimates of effective rates of protection (ERP) using the latest input-output table (for 2000) and nominal tariff schedule as at mid-2003. Going beyond the conventional practice of examining effective protection for importsubstitution production, the paper also focuses on the bias in the incentives structure against export production compared to import-substitution production ('ani-export bias').
Estimates of effective protection and anti-export bias are related to industry level output, export and employment to examine the implications of the policy regime for industrial performance.
The paper is arranged in six main sections. Section 2 surveys policy shifts and the key elements of the trade policy regime. Section 3 looks at the structure of import tariffs, which is the main instrument of trade policy, in comparison with selected countries in Asia. Section 4 examines the overall resource allocation effects of the trade regime through the estimation of effective rates of protection. Section 5 brings together available information on the impact of the structure of protection on the performance of domestic manufacturing. The key findings and policy inferences are summarised in the final section.
POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ELEMENTS OF TRADE POLICY
Vietnam embarked on market-oriented policy reforms with a predominantly importsubstituting manufacturing sector developed under a long-standing protectionist, state-led trade regime. Therefore, from the inception the policy regimes embodied a policy bias in favour of domestic-market oriented industries, which are dominated by state owned enterprises (SOEs). Within this broader policy orientation, attempts have been made in recent years to promote export-oriented industries side by side with the protected trade regime, resulting in a dualistic policy regime. Given the deep-rooted import-substitution bias in the policy regime, the emphasis on export promotion has essentially involved introducing certain counter-balancing measures in support of export-oriented activities with a view to offsetting the anti-export bias embodied in the protectionist regime. The following discussion is arranged in line with this fundamental dualistic characteristic of the trade policy regime. We first look at instruments used for protecting domestic market oriented industries and followed by a discussion on policies implemented to redress antiexport bias.
Instruments of Import Protection

(i) Import tariffs
During the command-economy era, trade taxes were not important either as a revenueraising instrument or as a tool of development policy in Vietnam (as in other former centrally-planed economies). The Law on Import and Export Duties introduced on 1 List has been done mostly by declaring goods that are already at zero or low rates and tariff reductions are yet to be announced on products included in the general exception list.
(ii) Non-tariff barriers
After one-and-a-half decades of trade reforms, tariffs are now the major instruments used in regulating imports to Vietnam. However, a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) still remains. A discussion that focuses only on the tariff structure cannot, therefore, capture the overall price-raising and resource allocation effects of the Vietnamese trade policy regime.
(a) Import Quota
Import quotas have been used in Vietnam side by side with import tariffs in order to limits imports which directly compete with domestic production by State Owned
Enterprises. By 1998, nine major products were remained under import quotas; petroleum, fertilizer, steel, cement, construction glass, motorcycles, cars of 12 seats, paper, sugar and liquor. These products accounted for approximately 40% of imports (CIE 1999) and over 45% of total manufacturing production (Athukorala 2002a) . In 1999 the number of products under quota restrictions was doubled mainly as a temporary measure to avert balance of payments pressure in the wake of the Asian Financial crisis.
Over the past two years quotas have been gradually eliminated as part of the new emphasis on speeding up trade liberalization. Currently only two products, namely sugar and petroleum products, are subject to quotas, and the government has committed to lifting quotas on sugar imports by 2005 (Table 1) .
Insert Table 1 (5201, 5202, 5203) . Of these, the last three items were to come under TRQs with effect from 1 July, 2003. The Ministry of
Trade was given authority to introduce TRQs on the remaining four commodities depending on conditions of domestic production and foreign trade.
TRQs are obvious less trade distortionary compared to prohibitive tariffs (or general import quotas). However, the market access rules under TQRs generally introduce scope for discriminating in the allocation of TRQs between source countries and domestic importers. In particular, the administration of such quotas tends to legitimise a role for state-owned trading agencies. There is evidence that, when such agencies have selling rights on the domestic market in addition to a monopoly on imports of the given products, they can charge excessive mark-ups and thereby distort domestic prices (Hoeckman and Kosteki 2002, p. 218) . For these reasons, trade analysts generally consider TRQs a relatively covertly element of quantitative management of import trade, which has unfortunately been legitimised under the WTO.
(c ) Import prohibition
Like in many other countries import prohibitions in Vietnam are based primarily on health and defence considerations, and they do not seem to have a major distortion impact on trade. The current list of prohibited items includes military equipment, toxic chemicals, antiquities, narcotics, firecrackers, poisonous toys, cigarettes, used consumer goods, and right-hand driving automobiles.
(d) Special authority regulation
A considerable number of import items (eg pharmaceuticals, some chemicals, some food items, fertilizer, and recording and broadcasting equipment) still require approval from relevant ministries. By 2000, around 10% of imports (in value terms) was subject to this form of regulation. As in many other countries, these regulations are generally maintained for heath and security reasons and they do not seems distort trade patterns.
(e) Entry Barriers to Import Trade
As early as the mid-1990s only licensed (authorised) trading companies were allowed to engage in foreign trade. In order to obtain an import/export license, enterprises needed to have a foreign trade contract and a shipping license, and to meet the requirements on minimum working capital ($ 200,000) and 'skill' in trade. In 1996 the requirements on foreign trade contracts and shipment permission were removed, but the minimum working capital requirement continued to remain a major entry barrier, especially for new enterprises. In 1998 there were only 2400 private sector companies involved in foreign trade compared to over 6000 SOE companies.
Significant changes of requirements for private sector firms to engage in foreign trade were introduced by Decree 57/1998/ND-CP (31 July 1998). The Decree permitted all enterprises with business licenses to engage in foreign trade in the goods specified in their business license without requiring import/export licenses. The number of enterprises registered for foreign trade increased from 2400 in early 1998 to over 5500 (or 55% of total number of 10000 trading companies) in 2002. However, firms are still allowed to trade only in commodities registered in the business licenses, and it is difficult to move from one kind of business to another without approved modification of the licenses.
There is evidence that regulatory requirements demanded by line ministries de facto prevent private firms from participating in rice exports and fertilizer imports (Auffret 2003, p. 5 
Policies to Redress Anti-export Bias
So far we have discussed the key elements of the trade policy regime that determine profitability of production for the domestic market. As the famous Lerner symmetry theorem stipulates, these restrictions on imports act as a tax on export production. They increase the cost of inputs to all industries thereby reducing relative profitability of exporting compared to production for the domestic market. As many other developing countries which attempts to promote exports in the context of a restrictive trade regime,
Vietnam has resorted to a number of measures to redress such anti-export bias.
(i) Duty free access to Imported Inputs
When a country attempts to promote exports side by side with a protected trade regime for production for the domestic market, it is important to assure uninterrupted duty-free access to the imported intermediate inputs needed for export production. There are two tools widely used for this purpose: export processing zone and import duty rebate.
The The duty rebate scheme in Vietnam was introduced in 1991. In 1993 a duty suspension facility was added to the scheme, enabling export-oriented firms (firms exporting more than 50% of output) to suspend duty payments up to 90 days. The suspension period was further extended to 275 days in 1998 for all enterprises, which import inputs for export production.
The operation of the duty drawback scheme in Vietnam has been examined in detail as part of a recent World Bank study on export policies and performance (World Bank 2002) . According to this study the operation of the scheme has improved considerably over the years. The time involved in processing duty rebate claims has become considerably shorter (now around 3-5 weeks compared to over 3 months at the formative stage of the scheme) as the customs officials gained experience in the implementation of the scheme. However, operation of the scheme still has left much to be desired, particularly for firms that export only part of their output or newcomers to exporting. Customs officers often make arbitrary assumptions, and often take long time, in deciding the proportion exported out of total output and input-output ratios applied in calculating the imports which may be imported duty free. In the absence of clear operational rules as to what evidence is to be supplied by the exporters in support of their application, the customs officers usually make decisions in an arbitrary, unpredictable fashion. If a given import item is not on the tariff schedule, customs officers wait for orders from their superiors, leading to unnecessary delays. These practices have also provided fertile ground for corruption, and favoured treatment of SOEs and well connected firms against other firms (particularly small-and medium scale one).
Compared to the highly successful duty rebate schemes in other Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Sri Lanka, in particular), the Vietnamese scheme has two structural limitations. First, it provides only for refunding duties paid by export producers on imported inputs. Local intermediate goods producers who supply inputs to export producers ('indirect exporters') are not eligible for duty rebates on imports used in production (that is, a local producer who supplies textile to producers of garments for export is not eligible for duty rebate on imports of cotton yarn). This essentially creates an the unnecessary bias in favour of using imported inputs, discouraging intermediate processing of inputs for the use in export industries. Second, duty rebates are estimated on a shipment-by-shipment basis based on "used-up ratios" declared and guaranteed by the importer (not on a pre-announced list of duty rebate rates). This practice works well for firms which import on a continuing basis, but problems arise when new and different cases have to be dealt with. In addition to these limitations, there are also other administrative problems with duty drawback system including some unnecessary paper work required by the Customs. For example, exporters are required to submit a certificate of export issued by the overseas importer to get duty refund. There is anecdotal evidence that, because of the rigid implementation procedures of the duty rebate schemes, some private firms (mostly small and medium sized firms) tend to rely on SOEs for exporting their produce and for procuring imported inputs (World Bank 2002).
(b ) Export Duty Removal
In the early years of market-oriented reforms Vietnam introduced export duties on a number of export items. They were justified at the time on grounds of protecting environment, natural resources conservation and reserve inputs for domestic production.
These duties were subsequently eliminated. By 1998 only two products -crude oil and scrap metal -were subject to export duties.
(c ) Exemption from domestic taxes
Vietnam has a wide array of domestic taxes: corporate income tax, value added tax (VAT), special sale tax, licence tax, agricultural land use tax, tax on land transfers, and natural resource tax. Concessions are given to exporters relating to corporate income tax and turnover tax, creating a tax wedge in favour of export production over production for the domestic market.
From 1999 to 2003, Vietnam had a two-band corporate income system; industries 25% and services 32%. This was unified at 28% with effect from 1 January 2004. Profit from export production is taxed at concessionary rate depending on the degree of export orientation of production. Firms exporting between 50-80% of production are taxed at 20% for twelve years (from the date when the project commences it production) while firms exporting at least 80% of production are taxed at a more favourable rate of 15% for fifteen years. Non-exporting firms are also eligible to these concession depending on criteria such as, contribution to employment, size of the wok force, use of advanced technology, intensive use of local raw material, investment in rural areas, and contribution to infrastructure construction/development.
VAT was introduced in January 1999 in place of the turnover tax. It has four tax lines: 0% for all exports, 5% for essential goods and services (such as water, fertiliser, insecticides, medicine, educational equipment, baby toys and animal foods); 20% for some specific services; and 10% for all other goods and services. The 20% rate was abolished on 1 January 2004, resulting in a three-band VAT system of 0%, 5% and 10%.
Imports are subject to VAT at the same rates as domestically produced goods under each tax bracket.
While the operation of tax administration in Vietnam has improved considerably in recent years, bureaucratic inertia and venality still believed to hinder effective provision of tax concessions for exporting firms, new small and medium scale firms in particular. The lack of clarity and transparency in the low, particularly in relation to tax inspection and rulings, also create a climate of uncertainty, which makes it impossible for business to predict their tax liabilities (CIEM 1999).
THE TARIFF STRUCTURE
This section looks at the structure of applied tariffs ( Union, Japan, most Asian countries outside ASEAN, New Zealand, Australia) and (3) general rates (50% above MFN rates) applicable to imports from countries that do not fall under (1) and (2).
Of these three categories of rates, by far the largest share of imports (over 95% in 2002) enters Vietnam under MFN rates (category 2). The CEPT rates are currently applicable to only about 3.5% of total import value (or about 10% of imports from ASEAN countries). Imports under general rates are believed to be negligible. For these reasons, the analysis in this and the following section focuses only on MFN tariffs. It is not possible to capture the incidence of the other two forms of tariffs in an aggregative analysis of this nature.
The distribution of tariff lines at the six-digit level of the harmonised System is summarised for 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2003 in An analysis at the HS Chapter level suggests that there is considerable nonuniformity of rates within and between HS chapters (data not reported here for brevity). 
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND ANTI EXPORT BIAS
As we have seen in the previous sections, the tariff structure in Vietnam is 'cascading' in nature, that is, tariffs are generally higher on final goods than on production inputs. An important implication of this cascading tariff structure is that the nominal tariff rates do not provide an accurate picture of the resource allocation effects of the overall tariff system. Under a cascading tariff structure, the resource allocation effects of the tariff structure on a given product sector depend not only on the tariff rate applicable to that sector but also on tariffs on all other sectors which provide production inputs administrative problems it seems less effective in compensating for small and medium scale firms and new entrants to export arena. 3 Singapore is not included because it is not an appropriate comparator given its advanced stage of economic transformation and the virtual free-trade status.
(intermediate and capital goods) to the sector, both directly and indirectly. In this section we attempt to examine the overall incentives provided for domestic traded goods production by the tariff structure by combining the tariffs on each sector and tariffs on its input-supplying sectors in the context of input-output linkages within the economy. The analytical tool used for this purpose is the effective rate of protection (ERP) (Corden 1971, Greenaway and Milner 2003) .
(a) The Basic Concept of ERP and Key Insights
The ERP measures the proportionate increase in per unit value added of a sector due to the complete system of tariffs. More specifically, it takes into account the protection on output and the cost-raising effects of protection on inputs. By definition, the ERP for sector j can be expressed as followed 4 : We have so far assumed that tariff measure is the only instrument of trade protection. In practice, countries use other instruments such as subsidies and import quotas in addition to tariffs as instruments of trade intervention. To capture these impacts, should be defined in broader terms to combine the nominal tariff on activity j and tariff equivalent of subsides, quantitative restrictions, and other forms of trade intervention.
t j
The conventional practice is to estimate a composite ERP for a given sector incorporating both incentives for export-and import-competing protection. However, in the context of an economy like Vietnam (and most developing countries) where exportpromotion policies are pursued along-side import-substitution polices, it is important to estimate ERP for import competing and export-oriented activities separately.
Let us denote ERP for production for domestic market and production for export in the same industry by ERP d and ERP e respectively. Combining the two measures provide us with a useful summary measure of the export bias embodies in the overall incentive structure.
where, EBI = Export bias index A positive EBI implies an incentive bias against exporting (that is a bias in favour of import-competing production) and a negative EBI implies an incentive bias in favour of exporting (a bias against domestic sales). For example an estimated EBI of 25 for a given industry suggest that under the given structure of protection, value added (returns to primary factors, labour and capital) in production for the domestic market in that industry is 25 per cent higher compared to production for export. By contrast an estimated EBI of -25 suggest that value added in production for export made possible by the structure of protection is 25% higher than that in production for the domestic market. The nominal rates used in estimation are simply the official applied tariff rates ('ex-ante' rates) summed up at the input-output sector level using import value weights.
The use of ex-ante tariff rates for measuring the price-raising effects of the tariff structure is of course problematic. First, as we have already noted, in Vietnam there are various formal and informal tax exemptions. Moreover tax evasion is also considered a widespread phenomenon (see the discussion below on fiscal implication of import taxation). Thus the ex-ante rates may overstate the prising rising effects. The 'ex-post' rate derived from actual duty collections and recorded imports appear to offer an adjustment for any potential upward bias. But, disaggregated data on customs collection are not available for Vietnam. In any case, the 'ex-post' rate provides a precise measure of the tariff-inclusive border price only if there is uniform exemption on the ex-ante rates for all importers (and for all sources of import) relating to a given import item. With non-uniformity in the application of exemptions, it will be the marginal rather than the average influence (captured by the weighted rate) that is important. In this case, the 'expost' tariff may be a downwardly biased measure of the price-raising effect of border taxation of imports and the ex-ante rates may more accurately capture the structure of protection (Greenaway and Milner 1991) .
Second, ex-ante (as well as ex-post) tariff rates fail to take account of quantitative restrictions and other forms of non-tariff barriers. We have noted above that, while quantitative restrictions are now applied only to sugar (and petroleum products, which are not covered in our calculations of ERP), imports are subject to various forms of nontransparent administrative protections. In the presence of such restrictions, the ex-ante rate tends to understate the price-raising impact of actual border protection. The obvious preferred strategy is to estimate the price-raising effect directly by comparing border (world) prices and domestic prices of the given products. It is not possible to adopt this strategy in Vietnam because data on domestic prices are not readily available. However, the available price comparisons for a limited number of commodities suggest that the wedge between the domestic price and border price are not very different from (and in some cases even lower than) scheduled tariffs (CIE 1999 , CIE 2001 , Athukorala 2002b ).
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In particular, in the domestic market for sugar, a combination of smuggling and market saturation resulting from surge in domestic production has caused prices to fall to the import parity price after about 1999 (CIE, 2001) . Thus, it is unlikely that the use of applied tariffs as the measure of price-raising impact of the trade policy regime would result in a significant downward bias in the estimated incidence of effective production.
Given the paucity of data, precise measurement of incentives for exportcompeting production (ERP x ) is even more difficult than measuring protection for import-competing production (ERP d ). Because of this reason, we come up with three alternative EBI indices based on three alternative measures of ERP x . The first index (EBI1) represent the extreme case in which the export producer suffers from higher prices for intermediate goods imports, but is unable to benefit from exemptions of import duties on imported inputs or any other tax exemption (A case of complete failure of various policy measures aimed at cushioning the export producer against the anti-export bias of the protectionist trade regime). Because export-oriented activities are often subject to tariffs on inputs and will not benefit from tariffs on exported output, this case implies an anti export bias across all sectors. Only the magnitude of the bias varies across sectors depending on the output tariffs. The second index (EBI2), like EBI3, incorporates a tax wedge of 6% but assumes only 80% of the import duties on intermediate imports are reimbursed under the import duty rebate scheme. 6 The third index (EBI3) depicts the case in which the duty rebate scheme is fully functional in reimbursing the exporter the total amount of duties paid on imported inputs and the existing tax exceptions creates a price wedge of 6% for export sales compared to domestic market sales (or tax exemptions amount to a 6% net subsidy for export production over production for the domestic market). We believe that EBI2 depicts closely the experience of the average exporter and EBI3 the case of well-established, large exporting firms.
(c ) Effective protection for Import-Competing Production
Effective protection estimates for import-competing production for 2003, together with the underline input and out put tariff and input coefficients, are reported in Table 5 . The estimates are summarised for the three major sectors of the economy -agriculture, mining and manufacturing -in Table 6 , together with estimates for 1997 and 2000 from a previous study (Athukorala 2002A) . The larger the dispersion of rates between sectors; the smaller the inter-industry differences in factor intensities; the lower the possibility of differential factor price effect on resource pulls. Ignoring the desirability or otherwise on the efficiency grounds of this structure of protection, it is unlikely that these estimates could be rationalised in terms of deliberate policy planning (that is, 'giving as much protection as is necessary to complete'). Very high protection provided to products such as tea, coffee, rice and wearing apparel in which the country has a clear comparative advantage remains a major anomaly in Vietnam's tariff structure.
The implications of the cascading nature of the tariff structure for the incentive structure for domestic manufacturing is vividly demonstrated by the ERP estimates for individual I-O industries. Since the nominal protection rates (NRP) on final goods are generally higher than those on intermediate goods, the net effect of the nominal tariff structure has been to yield ERPs that exceed the nominal tariff rate in most industries.
The rank correlation coefficient between NRP and ERP across the 83 sectors is rather weak (a mere 0.4), pointing to the importance of intermediate tariffs in determining the net protective effect of the tariff structure. As already noted, the significant decline in ERP for manufacturing as well as ERP for total traded good production has come from increase in input tariff introduced with the objective of protecting SOEs involved in intermediate production, rather than from reduction in final good tariffs. 
(d) Export Bias
In the previous section we have examined the incentives faced by import-competing production in Vietnam. This analysis has implications for export policy because import protection by definition is a tax on export-competing production. However, to get a fuller picture about the nature of relative incentives for export-competing production, it is important to make a direct comparison of returns to domestic sales (or import-competing production) with the returns to export sales (export-competing production) within individual sectors. This is the purpose of this section.
The estimated anti-export bias (EBI) indices are presented in Table 8 together with the underlying estimates of effective rates of protection for domestic-market oriented and export production (ERP d and ERP x ). For obvious reasons our focus here is only on the manufacturing sectors.
Table 8 about here
EBI1, which assumes the existing export incentive policies (duty rebate and other tax exemptions) to be completely inactive, provides a useful benchmark for our analysis.
According to this index all industries suffer significant anti-export bias, with an average anti-export bias of 105% for all industries listed (implying that selling in the domestic market is almost two times profitable compared to exporting). A comparison of EBI1
with the other indices clearly points to the important role played by the duty rebate and other tax exceptions in mitigating the anti-export bias in the tariff regime. Under the assumption of 80% import duty refund and a 6% price-wedge arising from other (domestic) tax exceptions (EBI2), the average anti-export bias decline from 105% to 58%. Under the assumptions of complete duty exemption a 6% price-wedge arising from domestic tax exemptions (EBI3), the measured degree of anti-export bias decline further to 25%.
A key inference from this comparative analysis of the three policy scenarios is that, while various indirect measures to counterbalance the anti-export bias of the protectionist regime seem to have had some effect, they are unlikely to achieve the desired neutrality in the incentive structure even if the efficiency of their implementation is substantially improved. More importantly, even in terms of EBI3 (which assumes complete duty rebate) there is a considerable bias against exporting in several of the sectors where a country of Vietnam's level of development has ample scope of achieving export success, such as garments, plastic products, leather goods, ceramics and other manufacturing. While there is much room to improve the efficacy of the duty rebate scheme and other tax exceptions, the objective of removing anti-export bias cannot be achieved through these cushioning measures alone, without further actions to rationalise the tariff structure.
Note that the estimated EBI2 and ABE3 for a number of product sectors (such as wood products, basic organic chemicals, inorganic chemical fertilizer, pesticide, plastic products, various types of machinery, ferrous metal and animal feed) are negative, implying a positive bias in favour of export production. These estimates simply reflects the fact that, given the high defence of imported inputs which are imported at relatively high duty, the existing duty rebate scheme makes export oriented production in these sectors relatively more profitable compared to production for the domestic market (for which producers in these industries have to pay duty on imported inputs). This by no means implies that the existing trade policy regime will be capable of making these industries export oriented. Export success depends primarily on the comparative advantage of a given sector in international production. Relative domestic incentives are only a facilitator of export success.
EBI for total manufacturing in 2003 is compared with estimates for 2001 in Table   9 . There is a clear reduction in the degree of anti-export bias in the incentive structure in terms of all three alternative measures. It seems that recent tariff reductions on final goods have played an important role in reducing the bias against exporting. This observation needs to be treated with care because, given the presence of an import duty rebate scheme for exporters, an increase in import tariffs automatically tilt EBI2 and EBI3 in favour of export production. captured in EBI2 and EBI3 as a tariff on imported input . However, the decline is anti-export bias is significant even in terms of EBI1 which does not capture the import duty rebate effect. studies. In this section we simply aim to put together existing evidence to address the issue of whether there is any evidence to suggest that protected industries have played a role in industrial transformation. Table 10 brings together our effective rate of protection estimates and selected performance indicators for the manufacturing sectors. Given the highly aggregative nature of the data, it is not possible to undertake any meaningful statistical analysis of the relationship between protection and the structure and performance of manufacturing.
But, a number of interesting patterns emerge from these data. First, it is clearly evident that high protection rates are generally associated with industries dominated by SOEs and/or foreign invested enterprises (which are mostly join ventures with SOEs). Most of the industries with greater participation of private enterprises such as leather and leather products, rubber and plastic products and furniture and other manufacturing operates under relatively low protection. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the existing structure of protection can be justified on grounds of infant industry protection.
Table 10 about here
Second, the price cost margin (an indicator of profitability) is generally higher in highly protected industries (compares columns 1 and 6). This comparison suggests that the existing structure of protection may have enabled certain industries to maintain profit margins at excessively high levels, at the expense of consumer welfare. This is an important aspect of protection-industry performance nexus, which certainly warrant further in-depth study.
Third, capital intensity of production (measured in terms of both value added per worker (column 7) and capital per worker (column 8)) are generally higher those in highly protected industries. 7 This implies that the existing structure of protection is not consistent with the employment generation objective of industrial policy. During 1990-2000, total manufacturing output grew by an impressive 9.5%, but employment grew only by a mere 1.8% reflecting the inherent capital intensity of the growth process. The relative contribution of heavily protected industries such as motor vehicles, other transport equipment, and fabricated metal products to total industrial output and employment has continued to remain low compared to many other sectors enjoying relatively low protection.
Finally, it is pertinent to comment briefly on the implications of the anti-export bias for export performance, an issue which has led to some controversy in the recent policy debate in Vietnam (Parker and Riedel 2002, pp. 11-12) . In recent years Vietnam has achieved rapid export growth in industries (in particular wearing apparel, shoes and furniture and electronics) where the incentive bias against exporting under the existing trade regime is very high. Does this mean that the anti-export bias as measured in this study is a misleading indicator of the impact of the incentive structure on export performance? The answer is a definite 'no'.
The anti-export bias is an indicator of the relative profitability of production for the domestic market compared to exporting. It is relevant for the production decision of a firm only if both these two options carry important weights in its marketing decision.
Selling in the domestic (Vietnamese) market is not an option for firms (mostly foreign firms) who select Vietnam as an export platform as part of their global sourcing. What is important for these firms is the relative profitability of producing in Vietnam compared to producing in other countries. In fact, the data on the ownership structure of manufacturing exports from Vietnam clearly suggest that much of the recent export expansion has been accounted for by such firms. For instance, the share of foreign invested enterprises in total manufacturing exports increased from 20% in the early 1990s
to over 70% by the early 2000s (Athukorala 2002b) . The upshot of this emerging export pattern is that Vietnam has so far failed to entice pure local firms, in particular small and medium scale firms (which always have a tendency to place a greater weight on the option of selling in the domestic market) to enter export markets (Athukorala and Matin 2002) . It is in explaining this policy failure that we need a clear understanding of the incentive bias embodied in the incentive structure.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY INFERENCES
Over the past one-and-a-half decades, Vietnam has made significant progress in marketoriented reforms. The transition to a market economy is far from complete, however.
Despite some significant recent efforts to rationalise the tariff structure and to remove some QRs, tariffs are still high and non-uniform in Vietnam, and extensive explicit and implicit administrative barriers continue to impact on import flows. The structure of trade protection in Vietnam is clearly out of line with that of the major trading nations in the region, both in terms of the level and the dispersion of nominal and effective protection rates.
Effective rate of protection for traded goods production (manufacturing, in particular) has recorded a significant decline over time. But the level of effective protection is much higher compared to the major East Asian economies. Moreover, increase in import duties on intermediate goods has played a much more important role than reduction in duties on final goods in the recent decline in ERP.
The counterbalancing effect of measures implemented to redress the anti-export bias in the trade regime (duty rebate, turnover tax concession and profit tax concession) is much smaller in magnitude compares to the price-raising impact of the existing import tariff structure. Thus there is a clear anti-export bias in the incentive structure, even though the degree of the bias has considerably declined in recent years. Ironically light manufactured goods industries such as garments, ceramics, footwear and sport goods, which have proved to be cradles for exporters in East Asian countries are among the sectors with above average anti-export bias (owing to very high import duties).
Anti-export bias in the incentive structure hinders the emergence of pure private sector firms (small and medium scale firms in particular) as a powerful vehicle for export expansion. It is not directly relevant for green-field foreign investors in export-oriented production because what is relevant for their profitability assessment is the relative attraction of Vietnam as a low-cost production platform compared to competing locations at the global scale. Protection discourages entrepreneurs to take advantage of international market opportunities. Much of the recent expansion in manufactured exports has come from foreign invested enterprises for which anti-export bias in the domestic incentive structure is not a concern. The share accounted for by pure local firms, in particular small-and medium-scale firms in export expansion has declined in recent years. This emerging dualistic export structure is consistent with the continuing anti-export bias in the incentive structure. Given that tariffs on most intermediate imports have already reduced to low levels and there is limited room for giving further tax concessions and/or introducing new financial incentives for exporters, the only effective strategy available for Vietnam to reduce/eliminate anti-export bias is further tariff reduction.
With tariffs coming down from highly restrictive levels, and QRs to be removed completely in the coming years, it is time to look at the entire tariff structure in totality, and to bring substantial uniformity into it. Apart from the cost of resource misallocation access to major markets (Hill 2000) .
involved, the multiplicity of rates implies that protectionist lobbies find it easier to lobby for tariffs, whereas, if uniformity is adopted as a policy, it would become relatively unprofitable to lobby for ones' tariff because of two reasons. First, the government could always argue that a specific demand for higher tariff could not be met because it would involve raising all other tariffs, which the government cannot do. Second, the lobbyist's advantage from getting the higher rate, thanks to its own lobbying (which cost money)
would be reduced because other tariffs, including of its own rate would rise equally. A move toward uniformity would be an effective way of reducing corruption involved and the arbitrary nature of the tax administration. A move towards a greater uniformity in tariff rates will also help reducing delays and malpractices involved in customs procedures. However, even under the most optimistic scenario for liberalisation reforms in Vietnam, tariffs are unlikely to come down to warrant abolishing the existing duty rebate scheme. As long as there are significant tariffs on intermediate imports there is a clear need for an efficient duty rebate scheme for providing export producers with 'freetrade conditions' in procuring inputs. : 1995 : CIE (1997 : Athukorala (2002 , and 2003: compiled from the tariff schedule provided by the Ministry of Finance. 55.0 25.0 EBI1 Captures the impact of import protection only (effects of duty rebate and domestic tax exemption for exporters set at zero) EBI2 Import protection + 80% duty rebate + 6% tax wedge for export production over domestic market oriented production EBI3 Import protection + 100% duty rebate + 6% tax wedge for export production over domestic market oriented production Source: Athukorala (2002) , Table 9 and this paper (Table 8) . 
Source
